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"OTHER ACTS" & CHARACTER EVIDENCE: PART II
Paul C. Giannelli
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W Weatherhead
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
This is the second of a two-part article on "other acts"
evidence and character evidence. The first article examined the conditions under which an accused may
introduce evidence of his good character and how such
character may ~e proved (e.g., reputation or opinion
evidence). That article also examined the prosecution
right to rebut such evidence, either on cross-examination
or by calling its own character witnesses.
This article discusses when evidence of a victim's
character is admissible. In addition, the admission of
"other acts" evidence is examined.
CHARACTER OF THE VICTIM
A second exception to the general prohibition against
the admissibility of character evidence is recognized in
Rule 404(A)(2). That provision permits an accused to
present evidence of a pertinent character trait of the
alleged victim of the charged offense.
Once the accused has introduced such evidence, the
prosecution may offer rebuttal evidence. The prosecution,
however, is prohibited from introducing evidence of the
victim's character until the defense "opens the door." See
State v. White, 15 Ohio St.2d 146, 150-51, 239 N£2d 65,
69-70 (1968); Reed v. State, 98 Ohio St. 279, 120 N.E. 701
(1918); Upthegrove v. State, 37 Ohio St. 662 (1882); State
v. Schmidt, 65 Ohio App.2d 239, 417 N.E.2d 1264 (1979).
Rule 405(A) limits the methods of proof that the
accused and the prosecution may use to show or to rebut
the character of a victim; only reputation or opinion
evidence is permitted.
A victim's character may be relevant in two types of
cases: on the issue of se.lf-defense in homicide and
assault cases and on the issue of consent in rape and
gross sexual imposition cases. In the latter cases, the
Ohio Rape Shield law controls. See R.C. 2907.02(0);
2907.05(0).
Seif-Defense Cases
Rule 404(A)(2) will be applicable principally on the
issue of self-defense. For example, a homi9ide defendant
could introduce evidence of the victim's violent and
aggressive character to show that the victim was the first

aggressor, thereby establishing one element of selfdefense. Once evidence of the victim's character is
introduced by the accused, the prosecution may
introduce rebuttal evidence of the victim's character for
peacefulness.
The prosecution's right to introduce evidence of the
victim's character, however, is not limited to cases in
which the defendant introduces evidence of the victim's
character. Any evidence that the victim was the first
aggressor in a homicide case triggers the prosecution's
right to introduce evidence of the victim's peaceful
character. Tlius, if the accused testifies that the victim
was the first aggressor, but does not introduce character
evidence on this issue, the prosecution may nevertheless introduce evidence of the victim's peaceful character
in rebuttal.
Victim's Character Affecting Defendant's State of Mind
Evidence of the victim's violent character may also be
relevant in a self-defense case to show that the accused
reasonably believed that he was in danger of death or
grievous bodily injury (an element of self-defense that is
different from the first ·aggressor issue). This situation,
however, does not involve the circumstantial use of
character to prove the conduct of the victim, but rather
involves proof of the defendant's state of mind, and thus
is not controlled by Rules 404 and 405.
Most of the Ohio cases have involved this issue. See
McGaw v. State, 123 Ohio Si. 196, 174 N.E. 741 (1931);
State v. Roderick, 77 Ohio St. 301, 82 N.E. 1082 (1907);
Upthegrove v. State, 37 Ohio St. 662 (1882); Marts v.
State, 26 Ohio St. 162 (1875); State v. Carlson, 31 Ohio
App.3d 72, 73, 508 N.E.2d 999, 1000 (1986).
If character evidence is introduced to show its effect on
the accused's state of mind, its relevance obviously
depends on whether the accused knew of the victim's
violent character. In contrast, if character evidence is
introduced to show that the victim acted in conformity
with that violent character and was therefore the first
aggressor, it is irrelevant whether the accused was aware
of the victim's character. See State v. Debo, 8 Ohio
App.2d 325, 222 N.E.2d 656 (1966). See also Ohio Jury
Instructions§ 411.31 and 411.33 (self-defense).

>ublic Defender Hyman Friedman
~uyahoga County Public Defender Office, 1200 Ontario Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113

Telephone (216) 443-7223

"he views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Public Defender.
;opyright © 1992 Paul Giannelli

'

RapeShi~ICI

Law

Under the common law, an accused in a rape case
c_o_uld introduceevidenGe of the victim's character for
chastity to prove consent. See McDermott v. State, 13
Ohio St. 332 (1862); McCombs v. State, 8 Ohio St. 643
(1858). Thisrule rested on the assumption that a woman
who has cons.ented to premarital or extramarital intercourse was more likely to consent than a woman who
had not consented to such past intercourse.
In recent years this assumption, along with other
aspects of rape prosecutions, lias been severely criticized. Most states,- including Ohio,.have responded to
this criticism by enacting "shield" laws which limit the
admissibility of evidenc~ ofJhe victim's character. See
Annat.; 94 A.L,R,3d 257 (1979); §15 A.L.R.3d 1181 (1979).
FtC. ~~-01.02(D) provic:lfis)li~fill rape cases:
· Evidence of specific ·instances ofthe victim's sexual
activity, opinion evidence ofthe victim's sexual activity,
and reputation evidE:mce of the victim's sexual activity.
shall not be admitted under this section unless it
invoi\ieseviderrce'ott.He-origin 6fsemen, pregnancy,
or disease; orthevictim~s past sexual activity with the·
offender, and only to the extent that the court finds that
the evidence is material td a fact at issue in the case
and that its inflammatory or prejudici;:d nature does not
outweigh its probative value,
A similanule relating to the defendant's prior sexual
activity is also contained irrthis provision. R.C. 2907.02(E)
provides for a pretrial in~chambers resolution of issues
thatarise unde-r tflis statute.
The rape shield law is designed to protect several
interests:
··· "Fifsftoy~gii~rdingltfefeeijlplainant's sexual-privacy
and proteQting h~r frorn undueharassment, the law
· diseot~ragel) the<tendencyin~rape'cases to try the
· victim rather than the defendant. In line with this, the
·la.w may encourage the-reporting of rape, thus aiding
crime prevention. Finally, by excluding evidence that is
unduly inflammatory and prejudicial, while being only
marginally probative, thE) statute is intended to aid in
the truth-finding process. State-v. Gardner, 59 Ohio
St.2d 14, 17-18, 391 N.E.2d 3~7, ~40 (1979).
Thestah.itednters in:two.respectsfrom the general
treatment of character,evidence under the R.ules of
Evidence. First, the statute allows consideration of
character evidence only insofar as it relates to sexual
activity.betweentheNictirn:anddefendant; Rule 404(A)(2)
contains no such limitation. Second; the statute permits
specific instances of conduct to be introduced; Rule
405(A)ILf11i!l?Jhe methods of proof to reputation and
opinion evidence.

<

Constitutionality of Rape Shield law
The constitutionality of rape shield laws that preclude
a defendant from introducing arguably exculpatory
evidence has been questioned. Two U.S. Supreme Court
cases, Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), and Chambers
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), are usually cited in
support of the defendant's right to introduce evidence of
the victim's character, at least in some circumstances.
In Davis v. Alaska the Court held that a state statute
excluding evidence of a juvenile adjudication (a type of
shield law) violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment

v.

~lght ofconfrontation urider the circumstances of that
case. In Chambers v. Mississippi the Court held that the
application of state evidentiary rules which precluded the
defendant from introducing critical and reliable defense
evidence violated due process.
Congress recognized the force of the constitutional
argument in enacting a federal shield law. Federal Rule
412 explicitly recognizes that the admissibility of
evidence of the victim's sexual activity may be "constitutionally required." Fed. R. Evid. 412(b)(1). See also 22
Wright & Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure
424;22(l9Z8); 23}d. §§_5_381-93 (1980).
See generally Galvin,Shielding Rape Victims in the
State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second
Decade, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 763 (1986); Tanford & Bocchino,
Rape Victim Shield_ L,aws and the Sixth Amendment, 128
U. Pa. L. Rev. 544 (1980); Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's
Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 Colum. L.
·
Rev. 1 (1977). ·
In State v. Gardner, supra, the Ohio Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Ohio statute as applied
in that case. The .Court, however, left open the possibility
that application of the statute might be unconstitutional
under different factual circumstances. /d. at 19 n. 5. In
State v. Graham, 58 Ohio St.2d 350, 390 N.E.2d 805
(1979), the Court was not presented with the constitutional issue. Because the defendant in Graham did not assert
"the defense of consent, which could well affect the
materiality ~nd relevancy ofthe disputed evidence,"
evidence of the victim's prior sexual activity was not relevant/d. at 352. See also State v. Thompson, 66 Ohio
St.2d 496, 422N.E.2d 855 (1981); State v. Collins, 60
Ohio App.2d 116, 396 N.E.2d 221 (1977).
In State v. Williams, 21 Ohio St.3d 33, 487 N.E.2d 560
(1986), theC::()IJQCOI}~icj~red the constitutional issue. The
alleged victim in Williams testified that she was "gay"
and thus would not have consented to sexual intercourse
with a man. The defendant claimed that the alleged
victim had consented. He also claimed that she was a
prostitute and that they had had sexual intercourse on
numerous previous occasions. In support of these
claims, the defense attempted to call a witness to testify
about the victim's reputation as a prostitute and another
witness who claimed to have had sex with the victim. The
trial court excluded,- based on the shield law, the testimony
of both witnesses.
On review; the Ohio Supreme Court agreed that the
evidence was not admissible under the rape shield law.
The Court, however, found that "the rape shield law as
applied in this case violates appellee's Sixth Amendment
right of confrontation." State v. Williams, 21 Ohio St.3d
33, 36, 487 N.E.2d 560 (1986). Unlike its prior cases,
which involved the use of the victim's prior sexual
conduct as impeachment evidence, the conduct in
Williams was relevant to consent, an essential element of
the charged offense and the one that the prosecution
first raised through the testimony of the victim.
False Accusations of Rape
In State v. Boggs, 63 Ohio St.3d 418, 588 N.E.2d 813
(1992), the defendant was precluded from crossexamining an alleged rape victim about a prior false
accusation of rape. The trial judge ruled that the question
violated the rape shield law. The Supreme Court, however,
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See State v. Shedrick, 59 Ohio St.3d 146, 150, 152 N.E.2d
59, 64 (1991); State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 66,330
N.E.2d 720 (1975). The terms "scheme" and "system"
appear only in the statute. These differences are not critical
because the "purposes" listed in Rule 404(B) are illustrative, not exclusive. See Staff Note ("non-exclusive listing").

disagreed. The Court ruled that "[f]alse accusations,
where no sexual activity is involved, do notfall within the
rape shield statute." /d. at 421. Instead, this line of ques~
tioning involves impeachment by prior bad acts that
reflect upon credibility. Rule 608(B), which governs this
issue, permits inquiry on cross-examination but
orecludes extrinsic evidence. Moreover, the defense
#ould have to establish that the accusation was false. If,
however, the prior accusation involved sexual activity, the
·ape shield law would prohibit this line. of questioning.
fhe Court summarized its holding as follows:
Therefore, we hold that before cross-examination of a
rape victim as to prior false rape accusations may
proceed, the trial judge shall hold an in camera hearing to ascertain whether such testimony involves
sexual activity and thus is inadmissible under R.C.
2907.02(0), or totally unfounded and admissible for
impeachment of the victim. It is within the sound
discretion of the trial court, pursuant to Evid. R.
608(8), whether to allow such cross-examination. /d.
at 424.

Preliminary Issues
Several prelimrnary points deserve attention. The
terms "similar act" or "prior crime" are frequently used
to describe the subject matter of Rule 404(B); these
terms are misleading.
Noncriminal Acts
First, the rule, by its own terms, is not limited to crimes;
it embraces "wrongs" and "acts" as well.
Subsequent Acts
Second, the "other act" need not have occurred prior
to the charged offense; evidence of a subsequent act
may be admissible. See State v. Wilson, 8 Ohio App.3d
216, 219, 456 N.E.2d 1287, 1291 (1982); United States v.
Riley, 657 F.2d 1377, 1388 (8th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 459
U.S. 1111, (1983); United States v. Childs, 598 F.2d 169,
170, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United States v. Bridwell, 583
F.2d 1135, 1140 (10th Cir. 1978).
Similar Acts
In addition, the other act need not be "similar." For
example, in the theft-of-a-gun example above, the other
act (theft) was not similar to the charged offense (homicide).
Offered by the Defense
Because the overwhelming number of cases involve
"other acts" of a criminal defendant, the following discussion will focus on those cases. Nevertheless, an accused
may also introduce evidence of "other acts." United States
v. Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d 906, 911 (2d Cir. 1984).

)anctions
In Michigan v. Lucas, 111 S.Ct. 1743 (1991), the U.S.
)upreme Court ruled that the exclusion of defense
1vidence for failing to comply with the notice provision of
1 rape shield statute was not per se unconstitutional. The
~ourt indicated, however, that exclusion in a particular
:ase might be unconstitutional. /d. at 1747.
"OTHER ACTS" EVIDENCE
Rule 404(B) provides that evidence of other crimes,
vrongs, or acts, although not admissible to prove characer, may be admissible for some other purpose, such as
1roof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
nowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
In effect} Rule 404(B) is a clarification provision. Rule
04(A) prohibits only the circumstantial use of character
vidence. When evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
cts is not offered to prove that a person (typically a
riminal defendant) acted in conformity with a pertinent
haracter trait, the prohibition of Rule 404(A) does not
pply. For example, if a person steals a gun and later
ses that weapon to commit a murder, the theft may be
3levant in the homicide prosecution to show the identity
f the murderer. Thus, although evidence of the theft
1cidentally shows larcenous character, it is not being
ffered for that purpose, and Rule 404(A) does not
rohibit its admission. See State v. Watson, 28 Ohio
t.2d 15, 275 N.E.2d 153 (1971).

Notice
Because evidence of other acts entails a significant
risk of unfair prejudice, care must be exercised in analyzing problems under Rule 404(B). One court has recommended:
Where the state seeks to use evidence of collateral
crimes in its case in chief, it would be prudent (if not
mandated by the due process requirement of advance
notice) to give the defense specific adequate pre-trial
notice and to advise the trial court to screen the
evidence in the absence of the jury. The trial court
should "pin down" the prosecution as to whether or
not the evidence is limited purpose evidence and
force the state to declare precisely what specific
purpose the evidence is claimed to serve. State v.
Smith, 59 Ohio App.2d 194, 199, 392 N.E.2d 1264,
1268 (1977).
In 1991 Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) was amended to include a
notice provision. its purpose is to eliminate surprise and
promote early and thoughtful resolution of the issue rather than risk haphazard and erroneous admission of such
evidence. As Justice Brennan has remarked: "Only
pretrial disclosure of such evidence will allow the ·
defense adequate opportunity to investigate the claim of
misconduct and to prepare objections to admission."
Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or
Quest tor Truth? A Progress Report, 68 Wash. U.L.Q. 1, 12
(1990). See a/so lmwinkelried, The Worst Surprise of All:

imilar Acts Statute
Rule 404(B) supersedes R.C. 2945.59, which is known
s the "similar acts" statute. The rule and statute differ in
everal respects. First, the statute applies only to acts of
defendant in a criminal case. In contrast, the rule
pplies in both civil and criminal cases and to the acts of
ny person, not only those of an accused.
Second, the rule and statute do not contain the same
~rminology. The terms "intent," "motive," "plan," and
~bsence of mistake or accident" appear in both. The
1rms "opportunity," "preparation," "knowledge," and
dentity" appear in the rule, but not the statute. The statte, however, has been interpreted to include "identity."
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No Right to Pretrial Discovery of Prosecution's Uncharged
Misconduct Evidence, 56 Ford. L. Rev. 247 (1987).
Several~tatejurisdictions also require notice in this context. See Minn. R. Grim. P. 706; Fla. Stat. 90.404(2)(b)(1);
Tex. R. 404(b).
Rule of Construction
The Supreme Court has often advised caution in this
area.Jn State v. Burson, 38 Ohio St.2d 157, 311 N.E.2d
526 (1974), the Court stated that "R.C. 2945.59 must be
strictly construed against the state." /d. at 158. In State v.
Broom, 40 Ohio St.3d 277, 533 N.E.2d 682(1988),~cert.
deni~d. 490 U.S. 1075 (1989), the Court wrote: "Because
R.C: 2945.59 and Evid R 404(B) codify an exception to
the common law with respect to evidence of other acts of
wrongdoing, they must be construed against admissibility,
and the standard for determining admissibility of such
evidence is strict." /d. (syllabus, para. 1). Accorq State v.
Coleman, 45 Ohio St.3d 298, 299 544 N.E.2d 622 (1989),
· cert. denied 493 U.S. 1051 (1990).

likely that a person with a motive committed a homicide
than a person without a motive (identity issue), and it is
more likely that a person with a motive acted purposely in
causing a death than a person without a motive (mens
.
rea issue).
Thus, the first step in determining admissibility under
Rule 404(B) is hot to identify which purpose listed in Rule
404(B) the evidence is offered to prove, but rather to
identify which element of the charged offense the "other
acts" evidence is offered to prove. Typically, "other acts"
evidence is admitted as proof of one of three essential
elements~(1H!)oshow4hat the accused was the actor
(identity issue); (2) to show that the accused possessed
the requisite mental state (mens rea issue); or (3) to show
that a crime was. committed (corpus delicti). See 22
Wright & Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure 460
(1979).
Relevancy
As discussed above, evidence of "other acts" must be
relevant to a material or consequential fact. Rule 401
defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any" consequential or
material fact "more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence."
Identity
The identity of the person who committed the charged
offense is always an essential element, and therefore
always constitutes a material fact. "Other acts" evidence
may show identity in a number of ways. For example, evidence that the defendant participated in a prior robbery
in which a weapon was stolen would be relevant to prove
the identity of the murderer in a homicide case in which
the same weapon was used. See State V; Watson, 28
Ohio St2d 15; 275'N~E2d 153 (1971). Several of the
"purposes" specified in Rule 404(B), such as motive,
opportunity, or preparation may be relevant to the issue
of identity.
Evidence of similarity between the "other act" and the
crime charged is frequently offered to prove identity; i.e.,
the modus operandi of both crimes is so similar that the
same person must have committed both offenses. The
commission of two robberies with a weapon, however,
would not satisfy theminimum relevancy standard of
Rule 40i and would thus not be admissible. According to
McCormick, ''the mere repeated commission of crimes
of the same class., such as repeated burglaries or thefts"
is insufficient. "The pattern and characteristics of the
crimes used must be so unusual and distinctive as to be
like a signature." C. McCormick, Evidence§ 190, at 560
(3d ed. 1984).
See also State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.3d 137, 142, 551
N.E.2d 190, 195 (1990) ("evidence of 'other acts' to prove
· ... the identity of the perpetrator is admissible where two
deaths occur under almost identical circumstances.');
State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 66, 73, 330 N.E.2d 720, 726
(1975) ("similar crimes within a period of time reasonably
near to the offense on trial, [and] that a similar scheme,
plan or system was utilized to commit both the offense at
issue and the other crimes.'); State v. Hector, 19 Ohio
St.2d 167, 177, 249 N.E.2d 912, 918 (1969) ("There must
be some similarity of methodology employed which itself
would constitute probative evidence of the probability
that the same person ... committed both crimes ... .');

Rule403
Rule 404(B) provides only that evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts may be admissible; admission is not
mandatory. The rule, however, provides no standard for
deciding when such evidence may be admitted. Since
admission in this· instance involves questions of relevance, Rules 401 to 403 are the controlling provisions.
These provisions, however, must be read in conjunction with prior Ohio cases. Rule 102 provides that the
Rules of Evidence "shall be construed to state the .
ccHTltnon law of Ohio unless the rule clearly indicates that
a'Cifange wasintended ...." The Staff Note to Rule 404
indicates that no change was intended. Rules 401 to 403,
read in light of the prior Ohio cases, seem to limit admissibility of evidence of other acts to instances where the
prosecution can establish that (1) the evidence is probative of a consequential or material fact; (2) such consequential or material fact is a disputed issue in the case;
and (3) the probative value of the evidence substantially
outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice.
Consequential (material) Facts
As an initial matter, "other acts" evidenc~ must tend to
prove a material or consequential fact. See Rule 401;
State v. Gardner, 59 Ohio St.2d 14, 20, 391 N.E.2d 337,
341 (1979) ("Our task is to determine first, whether any of
the elements mentioned in the statute were material to
the issue at trial, and if so, whether the disputed testimony
was relevant, as tending to prove a material element.").
Facts which tend to prove essential elements of the
charged offense are always material. Some of the
"purposes" specified in Rule 404(B), such as identity,
intent, and knowledge, name essential elements of
crimes; thus, evidence relevant to one of these purposes
is usually material. Other "purposes" listed in the rule,
however, are not typically elements of crimes. For example, motive, opportunity, and plan are rarely essential
elements. If the "other acts" evidence is offered for one
of these purposes, the prosecutor must establish a relationship between the "purpose" and an essential
element of the charged offense. Proof of motive, for
instance, may be relevant to show identity or some mens
rea element such as intent or purpose; that is, it is more
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State v. Hall, 57 Ohio Ap,p.3d 144, 148, 567 N.E.2d 305,
309 (1989} (other act "not sufficiently distinctive to
demonstrate the identity of the perpetrator"), overruled
on other grounds, 42 Ohio St.3d 714, 538 N.E.2d 1065
(1989); State v. Smith, 59 Ohio App.2d 194, 202,392
N.E.2d 1264, 1269 (1977} ("There was no uniformity in
the time of day of the other acts, the method of entry, or
the items taken.").
Intent and Knowledge
Intent and knowledge are frequently mens rea elements
of crimes, and evidence of other acts may be relevant to
prove these elements. Motive and preparation may also
relate to these elements. For example, a defendant's illicit
affair with a homicide victim's wife is an "other act" which
tends to show motive, and a person with a motive to kill is
more likely to have intentionally killed than a person Without a motive.
Similarly, evidence that the defendant stole a gun the
day before a homicide may show preparation, and thus
be relevant to the issue of calculation and design in an
aggravated homicide case. See State v. Smith, 49 Ohio
St.3d 137, 142, 551 N.E.2d 190, 195 (1990) ("evidence of
'other acts' to prove intent to commit a crime"); State v.
Greer, 66 Ohio St:2d 139, 420 N.E.2d 982 (1981);State v.
Gardner, 59 OhioSt.2d 14, 391 N.E.2d 337 (1979); State
v. Flonnory, 31 Ohio St.2d 124, 285 N.E.2d 726 (1972};
State v. Moore, 149 Ohio St. 226, 78 N.E.2d 365 (1948).
Absence of Mistake orAccident
Absence of mistake or accident also relates to mens
rea. See State v. Snowden, 49 Ohio App.2d 7, 12, 359
N.E.2d 87,91 (1976) ('''absence of mistake or accident .. .'
is not a separate category but merely a converse ofthe
existence of specific intent.''); Ohio Jury Instructions §
411.01. For example, a defendant charged with aggravated
murder who testifies that the weapon discharged by acCident when he was handling it and that he was unfamiliar
with weapons is raising a defense of accident. Such
evidence tends to negate the mens reaelemE!nt of purposefulness. In order to rebut this evidence of lack of
intent, the prosecution may introduce evidence that the
defendant used a weapon during the course of a prior
robbery. Evidence of absence of mistake or accident is
typically admitted in rebuttal rather than in the prosecution's case-in~chief./d. at 15-16.
In State v. Burson; 3a Ohio St.2d 157, 311 N.E.2d 526
(1974), the Supreme Court commented:
The other acts of the defendant must have such a
temporal, modal and situationai relationship with the
acts constituting the crime charged that evidence of
the other acts discloses purposeful action in the commission of the offense in question. The evidence is
then admissible to the extent it may be relevant in
showing the defendant acted in the absence of
mistake or accident. !d. at 159 (emphasis added).
Interrelated Acts
In some cases it is impossible to exclude evidence of
other acts that are interwoven with a charged offense
even though such acts are not material to an essential
element of that offense. In State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d
66,330 N.E.2d 720 (1975), the Supreme Court recognized that there are some
situations in which the "other acts" form part of the
immediate background of the alleged act which forms
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the foundation of the crime charged in the indictment.
In such cases, it would be virtually impossible to prove
that the accused committed the crime charged with. out also introducing evidence of the other acts. To be
admissible ... the "other acts" testimony must concern
events which are inextricably related to the alleged
criminal act ... /d. at 73.
This situation is sometimes described as evidence of
"res gestae." See State v. Spears, 58 Ohio App.2d 11, 387
N.E.2d 648 (1978).

Defendant's Involvement in the Other Act
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible
only if such evidence is relevant to a material or consequential fact (Rule 401). At a minimum, the prosecution
must establish that the defendant committed the other
act. Otherwise, the evidence is not relevant.
Some courts have required "substantial proof" or
"clear and convincing evidence" of the defendant's
involvement in the other act. C. McCormick, Evidence §
190, at 564 (3d ed. 1984). The Ohio cases have used the
"substantial proof" standard. See State v. Shedrick, 59
Ohio St.3d 146, 15.0, 572 N.E.2d 59, 64 (1991); State v.
Jamison, 49 Ohio St.3d 182, 187, 552 N.E.2d 180, 185
(1990) ("Other-acts evidence need be proved only by
substantial proof, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt."),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 228 (1990); State v. Dick, 27 Ohio
St.2d 162, 271 N.E.2d 797 (1971); State v. Carter, 26 Ohio
St.2d 79, 269 N.E.2d 115 (1971).
In Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988),
the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the common law
approach, which requires clear and convincing or
substantial evidence. Instead, the Court, based on
Federal, Evidence Rule 104(b), adopted a prima facie
evidence standard. The Court explained:
In determining whether the Government has introduced
sufficient evidence to meet Rule 104(b), the trial court
neither weighs credibility nor makes a finding that the
Government has proved the conditional fact [stolen TVs]
by a preponderance of the evidence. The court simply
examines all the evidence in the case and decides
whether the jury could reasonably find the conditional
fact- here, that the televisions were stolen - by a
preponderance of the evidence. /d. at 690.
This ruling applies only to federal trials.
Disputed Issues
· Even if "other acts" evidence is probative of an essential element of the charged offense, the evidence is not
admissible unless that element is a disputed issue in the
case. See 22 Wright & Graham, Federal Practice and
Procedure 489-90 (1979). For example, as noted above,
evidence of "other acts" that shows motive may be relevant to the issue of identity. If, however, the defendant
admits the act but claims self-defense, identity is not an
issue in the case, and the evidence should be excluded
because its prejudicial effect will outweigh the need for
the evidence under Rule 403(A). See State v. Snowden,
49 Ohio App.2d 7, 13, 359 N.E.2d 87, 92 (1976).
In State v. Eubank, 60 Ohio St.2d 183, 298 N.E.2d 567
(1979), the state argued the admissibility of evidence of
"other acts" on the theory that such evidence showed an
absence of mistake or accident. The Supreme Court held

admission was error because "[m]istake or accident was
not a material issue." /d. at 186. See a/so State v. C\,Jrry,
43 Ohio St:2d66,-73; 330 NE2d 720, 726 (1975) ("In the
present appeal, identity was not a material issue.").
Frequently a stipulation will eliminate an issue from
dispute and thuspreclude the need for "other acts" evidence. See United States v. Mohel, 604 F.2d 748 (2d Cir.
1979); United States v. DeVaughn, 601 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.
1979); United States v. Williams, 577 F.2d 188, 191 (2d Cir.
1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 868 (1978) ("[o]ther crimes
evidence is inadmissible to prove intent when that issue
is not really in dispute.").

U.S. SUpreme Court considered the admissibility of
"other acts" evidence under Federal Rule 404(b) in
cases in which the accused had been acquitted of the
prior crime. The defendant objected on double jeopardy
and due process grounds. The double jeopardy argument focused on the collateral estoppel rule.
Accordillgto the Court, the prior acquittal meant only
that the prosecution had failed to establish the defendant's
guilt of the prior crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The
standard of admissibility for evidence of other crimes is
far less demanding. The prosecution in a federal trial
need only introduce evidence from which the jury could
reasonaoly-coi"iclUCIEHhat the accused had committed
theip~ior act. Thus, collateral estoppel did not apply. In
addition, tile Court found nothing fundamentally unfair
about introducing such evidence.

Balancing Probative Value Against Unfair Prejudice
Rul€l4Q3(A) provides th~t relevant evidence must be
excluded if its probative value Is substantially outweighed
by the dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or
misleading the jury. The decision to admit evidence of
other acts is subject to Rule 403. The Advisory Committee's Note t() Federal Rule 404(b) states: "No mechanical
solution is offered. The determination must be made
whether the danger of undue prejudice outweighs the
probative value of the evidence in view of the availability
of other means of proof and other factors appropriate for
making deCisions of this kind under Rule 403."
Evidence of other acts presents all three of the dangers
specified in Rule 403(A), but especially the danger of unfair prejudice, because the jury may use the evidence for
the impermissible purpose of determining character. Rule
403(A), by requiring that unfair prejudice substantially
outweigh probative value before exclusion is required,
manifests a bias in favor of admissibility.
TheO!Jio cases, however, demonstrate. a bias against
admissibility. In State v. Lytle, 48 Ohio St.2d 391, 358
N .E.2d 623.(1976), vacated_oo_gth~LgiQIJ.nds, 438 U.S.
910 (1978), the Supreme Court required thai Hie'evli::iemce
of "other acts" be "substantially" relevant for some purpose other than to show a probability that the individual
committed the crime on trial because he is a man of
criminal character. /d. at 402; accord, State v. Hector, 19
Ohio St.2d 167, 249 N.E.2d 912 (1969). The prior cases
should control because the Staff Notes to Rules 403 and
404 indicate that these rules are not intended to change
the existing law. See a/so Rule 102.

Entrapment
Ohio follows the majority rulE! on entrapment, sometimes known as the "origin of intent" test. See LaFave &
Scott, Criminal Law 5.2 (2d ed. 1986). Under this test,
entrapment occurs "when the criminal design originates
with the officials of the Government, and they implant in
the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit
the alleged off!=Jnse and induce its commission in order
that they may prosecute." Sorrells v. United States, 287
U.S. 435, 442 (1932). See a/so United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. 423 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S.
369 (1958); Ohio Jury Instructions§ 411.25 (entrapment).
Under this view of entrapment, the question of the
defendant's predisposition (propensity) is a material
issue~ and the aefendant's prior criminal conduct
becomes relevant. As the Supreme Court has stated,
"if the defendant seeks acquittal by reason of entrapmenrne_"Caiinorcorrfplain of an appropriate and search. ing inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition as
bearing upon the issue." Sorrells v. United States, supra,
at 451.
Thus, an entrapment defense necessarily raises
issues concerning the defendant's character and
commission of "other acts." Although the commentators
disagree on the theory of the entrapment defense, they
do agree that the Federal Rules of Evidence have not
changed the J:>rior law on the subject. See 2 Louise II &
Mueller, Federal Evidence 129~33 (1978); 22 Wright &
Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure 372-79 (1978).

Double Jeopardy and Collateral Estoppel
In Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990), the
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